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Given the increased numbers of disasters and humanitarian crises which occur in the face of diminishing global
resources, the contemporary disaster management and humanitarian fields face greater challenges to optimize
cooperation and coordination processes among actors as well as in ensuring and increasing humanitarian aid
delivery performance. This research, by using two case studies, will comparatively investigate inter-organizational
cooperation and its performance on humanitarian operations during emergency response periods of the West
Java Earthquake 2009 and the West Sumatera Earthquake 2009 in Indonesia. A combination of quantitative analysis,
social network analysis (SNA), and qualitative analysis is used. SNA has been proven to be instrumental in modeling
humanitarian actors’ cooperation. In this research, humanitarian operation performance is analyzed in terms of
its coherence, coverage, and connectedness. By categorizing results from the SNA in correlation with Gillmann’s
typology, it is proven that the networks in West Java fit the lead-agency type while in West Sumatra fit the
lead-partnership type. In terms of performance, humanitarian operations in West Sumatra performed better in
all three criteria compared to those in West Java. Based on the conclusions from this research, recommendations
to improve cooperation and coordination among humanitarian actors in disaster situations have been made.
Keywords: Cooperation, Earthquake, Emergency, Humanitarian cluster, Social network analysisIntroduction: contemporary discourse on
cooperation in disaster and humanitarian crises
The contemporary humanitarian and disaster management
field faces several interrelated challenges and problems
which make study on coordination and cooperation vital to
save as many lives as possible and to lessen impacts. To
begin with, there is a growing trend in the number and
scale of disasters (UNISDR 2015; Cahill 2012), including
that of climate-related and man-made disasters. During the
first decade of this century alone, 4000 disasters occurred,
significantly jumping from the 900 disasters during the
1970s (Brinkman 2010). In particular, the mortality and
economic losses associated with disaster risks in low-
and middle-income countries are an uptrend, with the
average of economic losses from disasters reaching anCorrespondence: mizanbfbisri@stu.kobe-u.ac.jp
Department of International Cooperation Policy Studies, Graduate School of
International Cooperation Studies, Kobe University, GSICS Building, 2-1
Rokkodai, Nada-ku, Kobe-shi, Hyogo-ken 657-8501, Japan
© 2016 Bisri. Open Access This article is distrib
License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/b
medium, provided you give appropriate credit
license, and indicate if changes were made.average of US$250 billion to US$300 billion each year
(UNISDR 2015).
These disasters have happened in the face of diminish-
ing resources for aid relief, humanitarian operations, and
reconstruction. For example, there has been a significant
reduction in official development assistance from major
donors for disaster relief and it is believed that this trend
will continue even until the post-2015 period (Cahill
2012). Salvatore (2012) provides more evidence that over
the past decade, international governments have spent
about $90 billion on humanitarian assistance, although
the actual needs were far greater. He further claims that
aid spending often covers no more than two thirds of
aid needs. At the same time, inter-relationships between
multiple humanitarian actors from global to local levels
continue to search for optimum cooperation processes and
coordination structures (Gillmann 2010; Taylor et al. 2012;
Fredriksen 2012) within a complex network of polycentric
disaster governance (Lassa 2015) and on how to improve
performance on humanitarian aid delivery (Moore et al.uted under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International
y/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any
to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons
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et al. 2012). Therefore, research on networks of actors in a
given disaster case and how it affects humanitarian aid op-
erations will contribute to the discourse.
The topic of coordination and cooperation in managing
contemporary disasters and other humanitarian emergen-
cies is linked to a broader debate on the relative roles of the
state, the private sector, and non-governmental organiza-
tions in ensuring collective security. According to Lakoff
(2010), the main concern is how lines of responsibility
among diverse organizations should be drawn, in terms of
both jurisdictional responsibility and technical capacity.
Thus, to manage disaster situations, what is in need are
either new regulatory norms or new organizational forms,
i.e., with the particular role of the government being to de-
sign a mechanism in doing so. Furthermore, Jasanoff (2010)
also noted a similar notion: contemporary disaster risk and
its response have escaped the control of technocratic man-
agers and should be understood more broadly as a prob-
lem of democratic governance. Specifically, the ongoing
discourse is whether coordination and cooperation during
a disaster situation should be centralized or decentralized.
Roberts (2010), based on the US Federal Emergency Man-
agement Agency, states that governing disaster response
requires a networked form of government that links the
federal, state, and local levels of the government and
private organizations (including non-government organiza-
tions (NGOs)). Thus, even though these actors share com-
mon goals, they are not subject to direct command;
hierarchy alone is a poor tool to respond to disaster. In his
view, successful disaster response occurs not through com-
mand from above but through loose networks of formal
organizations and informal professions that maintain broad
agreement about shared goals and responsibilities. Lassa
(2015) stated that the observed “tragedy of commons”
following the Indian Ocean Tsunami of the 2004 shows the
complexity of the network in the post-disaster governance.
In practice, the preceding discourse is evident with the
establishment of the humanitarian clusters after the Indian
Ocean Tsunami in 2004. The cluster approach is an effort
for coordinating humanitarian actors by sector aimed at im-
proving the effectiveness, predictability, and accountability
of humanitarian response (Fredriksen 2012). It was launched
in 2005 by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC). A
cluster is a group of organizations in a specific sector of
humanitarian response that works together to coordinate
operational activities (IFRC 2012). It is also a formal hu-
manitarian coordination forum for sectors of the response
at the country level (Clarke and Campbell 2015). At the
global level, it comprises 11 clusters: (1) camp coordination
and management; (2) food security; (3) early recovery; (4)
education; (5) emergency shelter; (6) health; (7) nutrition; (8)
protection; (9) water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH); (10)
emergency telecommunications; and (11) logistics.The arrangement of a cluster is applied at both the inter-
national level and at the country level in which the latter
generally mirrors the global clusters. Indonesia is one of the
countries which adopted the cluster approach. The IASC
team in Indonesia and the Government of Indonesia
produced a national contingency plan in early 2009, a few
months before the earthquakes studied here (IASC 2009).
However, depending on each country and the emergency
itself, some clusters can be combined (IASC 2006) and that
the clusters are activated when there is an international
response to an emergency upon request of the host govern-
ment (IFRC 2010).
In each cluster, the IASC has designated a lead agency,
i.e., an agency responsible for providing leadership in the
cluster which would be accountable to the UN Emergency
Relief Coordinator (ERC) through the United Nations
Office for Coordinating Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA).
At the global level, the lead agency manages three areas:
standards and policy setting, capacity building, and oper-
ational support. The cluster approach encourages the global
cluster lead to be proactive in ensuring partners include
national and local organizations. Meanwhile, the country-
level clusters are tasked with coordinating actors in each
sector in specific crisis responses and ensuring that stan-
dards for practice set by the global clusters are met during
these responses (IASC 2006).
At the country level, national government ministries
formally act as co-chairs in cluster meetings, sometimes
even acting as cluster co-leads with the appointed lead
agency (Fredriksen 2012). The extent to which government
ministries participate as true partners in the clusters, how-
ever, varies greatly from country to country. In Indonesia,
government ministries have been active participants in the
cluster-based coordination of humanitarian responses to
natural disasters within their territories (Fredriksen 2012).
The existence of representatives from the government as
co-leads in the cluster is also seen as a source of legitimacy.
To this end, whether or not a lead agency in a cluster truly
acts as the ultimate leader which governs all government/
non-government humanitarian actors is still perceived,
by many, as debatable. Furthermore, in reality, even
within the same country during the same disaster, clus-
ter hubs can be set up in several locations and a lead
agency may be appointed differently in each hub or ad-
ministrative boundary.
Specific to the IASC clusters, Clarke and Campbell (2015)
state that the term “coordination” inside the humanitarian
sector often describes loosely a variety of different kinds of
relationships and coined that in reality, there are three levels
of coordination between complete independence and
full merger during humanitarian operations, i.e., com-
munication, alignment and collaboration. According to
their research, humanitarian clusters generally fall in to
the “alignment level,” i.e., organizations retain a high
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to create a more effective response on the basis of
activities of other organizations. The research was able
to showcase that generally, cluster members decided to
join a coordinated response since the benefits (access
to guidance and information, opportunities to build rela-
tionships and see the bigger picture, as well as increased
legitimacy for activities) outweigh the cost (time, loss of
autonomy, and competitive advantage). However, their
concept of coordination levels will not be able to visualize
the actual network of multiple organizations engaged in
emergency response of a humanitarian crisis. In addition,
their work is also limited to the observation of the cluster’s
work regarding joint strategy development and joint
assessments and thus does not looked into actual relation-
ship of cluster members in the implementation of emer-
gency response activities.
Gillmann (2010), on the other hand, used insights from
the Darfur Crisis and Indian Ocean Tsunami in 2004 and
proposed four typologies for cooperation of humanitarian
efforts, i.e., Loose Alliance, Orchestrated Alliance, Lead
Partnership, and Lead Agency, whereas the illustration and
brief description of each type can be seen in Fig. 1. Among
this typology, Gillmann argues that a lead-agency network
is the best pattern for inter-organizational cooperation at
the time of a disaster, to best meet the standard perform-
ance of humanitarian operations. The proposition of the
typology is very important and, as she herself suggests,
needs to be tested in other cases. Even though her work
also originates from network theory, her approach is fully
qualitative and only incorporates global humanitarian ac-
tors and does not incorporate local actors, which in reality
also participate in the humanitarian efforts.
Therefore, in this paper, the author would like to test the
typology proposed by Gillmann (2010) using a larger dataset
of actors. For testing, at least two comparable case studies
are needed. Accordingly, this paper will comparatively study
inter-organizational cooperation of emergency response in
two earthquakes in Indonesia, i.e., the West Java Earthquake
on 2 September 2009 and the West Sumatra Earthquake on
30 September 2009, and their impact on humanitarian aid
delivery operations. Both earthquakes happened at nearly
the same time, in the same country, and fall within the sameFig. 1 Typology for inter-agency coordination of humanitarian efforts at themergency level based on the Indonesian IASC Contingency
Plan (IASC 2009). In addition, both earthquakes in their
occurrence serve as an early test to the newly established
Indonesian Disaster Management system of Law 24/2007
and humanitarian clusters adopted by global humanitarian
actors as defined by UN Resolution 46/182. The author
agrees with DARA (2010) and Wilson (2010) that both
earthquakes provide a stark comparison of response after
natural disasters in the same country. The cases are ex-
pected to show the difference of network creation, given the
different trajectories of political decision of the govern-
ment in responding to each earthquake, particularly on
perception of the strength of the state and decision to acti-
vate humanitarian clusters, which include that of inter-
national organization.
Objectives and research questions
In general, this paper aims to contribute to the theoretical
discourse as well as practical queries in the subject of
inter-organizational cooperation arrangement at the time
of disaster and humanitarian crisis. The specific research
goal is to comparatively investigate inter-organizational
cooperation and its humanitarian operation performance
during the emergency response of the West Java Earth-
quake 2009 and the West Sumatra Earthquake 2009.
Accordingly, the research objectives include the following:
(1) examine the practices of inter-organizational cooper-
ation during the emergency response of both earthquakes;
(2) model the networks of inter-organizational cooper-
ation during the emergency response of both earthquakes
and explore their characteristics, i.e., by using social
network analysis (SNA) performed using UCINET version
6.532 (Borgatti et al. 2002) and categorized based on
Gillmann’s typology (Gillmann 2010); (3) identify and
compare performance of humanitarian aid operations
resulting from the given network of actors and its cooper-
ation, i.e., by using some criteria conceptualized by Beck
(2006); and (4) identify policy implications and their prac-
tical relevance to the humanitarian field, e.g., in the context
of Indonesia, Southeast Asia, and international humanitar-
ian system in general.
To meet the aforementioned objectives, the following
research questions are addressed: (1) In what ways dide time of disaster (Gillmann, 2010)
Bisri Journal of International Humanitarian Action  (2016) 1:8 Page 4 of 14inter-organizational cooperation function and create net-
works during the emergency response of both earth-
quakes? (2) What were the characteristics of cooperation
in humanitarian operations within the networks during the
emergency response of both earthquakes? (3) Which type
of network performed better in the emergency response of
both earthquakes?
Methodology: social network analysis and data
collection method
This research includes both quantitative and qualitative
approaches. SNA has been chosen as the main approach
in this study due to its ability to represent the structure
of relations between actors and to analyze a large num-
ber of relations within a network (Prell 2012). In short,
SNA is the study of the structural relationships among
interacting network members (individual, organizations,
etc.) and of how those relationships produce varying
effects (Varda et al. 2009).
In regard to the utilization of SNA in disaster and hu-
manitarian studies, a variety of research has been conducted.
Some research applies SNA for analyzing the individual level
of network in disasters, while others are more concerned
with organizational issues. Some individual-level research of
SNA may give explanations of who is at risk, who has more
capacity to recover (Haines et al. 1996), and how individual
strategies recover after a disaster (Hulbert et al. 2005). Other
research focuses on the organizational level of SNA to
analyze inter-organizational cooperation related to a disaster.
For example, in organizational-level research on developed
countries, Kapucu et al. (2010) give a broader view of aid
and emergency response following Hurricane Katrina and
by employing full quantitative SNA techniques, they suc-
cessfully show that further investment in the State Govern-
ment is needed because it proved to be the key actor. Other
studies were able to explain factors which decide organiza-
tions’ motivations to create, maintain, dissolve, and reconsti-
tute the inter-organizational links during Hurricane Katrina
by comparing results from manual and computed social
network analysis (Varda et al. 2009). However, both studies
have made little contribution to the greater discourse on
how to improve global cooperation for humanitarian efforts
at the time of disaster, since they primarily concentrate on
the case from a developed country, in which there is not
much cooperation among international and local actors.
Alternatively, another example came from the SNA model
of inter-organizational cooperation during the Great East
Japan Earthquake and Tsunami 2011 (Bisri 2016). Using the
Japan case, Bisri (2016) was able to showcase that multiple
actors engage during the emergency response at the time of
the 2011 tsunami, ranging from traditional and non-
traditional humanitarian actors. However, the effect of the
network to the humanitarian operation performance was
not within the scope of this paper.Few studies used SNA to analyze disaster in developing
and least-developed countries. Among them, Moore et al.
(2003) examine the role of network centrality in humani-
tarian operations following the 2003 Mozambique Flood
in which over 49 countries and 30 international NGOs
were involved in the relief effort. They tried to analyze
whether organizations with the potential to connect with
a number of other organizations were involved in higher
impact projects. As a result, they found that international
NGOs were highly central to the network of collaborators
and that centrality measurement result did affect the
number of the project’s beneficiaries. On the other hand,
Kumar (2011) analyzed inter-organizational networks dur-
ing the emergency response of the 2007 Peru Earthquake.
By analyzing the network of 300 organizations using SNA,
he argues that there was a pattern in the collaboration
behavior of organizations involved in the earthquake relief
effort, i.e., large international organizations played a
more central role in the overall relief effort. In addition,
he compares the behavior of collaborations at various
humanitarian clusters as well as between three munici-
palities affected.
In Indonesian context, Lassa (2010) uses SNA to identify
the relation among institutional features in disaster risk
management of Indonesia. He maps out which regulation is
the most referred to by the government and which actor is
the most central in disaster risk management in Indonesia.
Furthermore, by analyzing the polycentric governance using
SNA of the post-disaster stage of the Indian Ocean
Tsunami 2004, he shows important features of the network
of disaster actors, i.e., the degrees of separation on the post-
disaster network reflect the “small world” realities, existence
of loops in the network that reflect the tendency of
some actors not to cooperate, and importance of cer-
tain hubs in the network and the humanitarian cluster,
while other actors make scattered single principal-
client links (Lassa 2015).
In this research, SNA is being performed using the UCI-
NET version 6.532 (Borgatti et al. 2002) to produce net-
work graphs of both cases and analyzes the complete
network structure by performing egocentric measurements
on degree centrality and betweenness centrality, i.e., which
are common disaster research (Moore et al. 2003; Varda
et al. 2009; Kapucu et al. 2010; Kumar 2011; Bisri 2016).
Degree centrality is a measurement of an actor’s level of
involvement or activity in the network, and it calculates the
number of immediate contacts an actor has in a network
(Prell 2012, pp. 96–103). Betweenness centrality is a meas-
urement of to what extent an actor is located in the direct
path of exchange between two other actors in the network
(Wasserman and Faust 1994). It looks at how often an actor
rests between two other actors, i.e., calculates how many
times an actor sits on the geodesic (the shortest path) link-
ing two other actors together. The degree centrality and
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used as a proxy of an actor’s relative position in the coord-
ination structure. In addition, sociometric measurements
were also performed, i.e., density and clique identification.
Density refers to the proportion of ties in a network that
are actually present, and it counts how many actual ties
exist in a network and expresses this number as a propor-
tion of the potential ties that could exist in the network
(Prell 2012, pp. 166–167). Lastly, a clique is an informal
grouping of actors in the network which indicates the
strong cohesiveness in the subgroup; it refers to subgroups
of actors consisting of mutual ties (Prell 2012, p. 155). In a
disaster situation, a clique is subsets of organizations that
develop recurring patterns of interaction (Scott 2000).
In this research, the “nodes” represented in the SNA
model are organizations performing emergency response
activities, which range from national and local govern-
ment units, international NGO, local NGO, and agencies
of the UN, while the “ties” that link two nodes represent
joint delivery of emergency response activities, i.e., com-
bine all possible cooperation from financial support, hu-
man resource mobilization, and in-kind contribution. All
the measurements were done in “valued” and “directed”
mode, meaning that frequency and direction of relation-
ship among actors are detected and become sensitive to
each SNA measurement. In the model, the valued net-
work gives weight to each tie; thus, if a tie appears to be
thicker, it means more than one cooperation (joint im-
plementation of emergency response) were being done
by those connected two organizations.
Given the result of SNA, the model of networks from
both cases will be contrasted with the typology suggested
by Gillmann (2010). To bridge these two approaches,
Gillmann’s typology of networks (i.e., loose alliance, orches-
trated alliance, lead partnership, and lead agency) is used so
that the result of egocentric measurements through SNA
(degree centrality, betweenness, closeness, and eigenvector
centrality) of networks in both cases, drawn in principal-
component network mode, will fall into one category of
the typology. The use of principal-component is essen-
tial to bridge the visualization of SNA with the typology
of Gillmann, as the novelty of this paper.
To further analyze how the inter-organizational cooper-
ation network affects humanitarian aid operation perform-
ance, several criteria provided by Beck (2006) will be used.
There are seven criteria in evaluating humanitarian action:
relevance or appropriateness, connectedness, coherence,
coverage, efficiency, effectiveness, and impact. It is posi-
tioned as the continuation of DAC criteria in evaluating
humanitarian action, whereas Beck (2006) adds another
three criteria to merge with the original five criteria and
thus the seven aforementioned criteria. Given the nature
of this research, which is a more “system-wide” analysis,
the most appropriate criteria to assess humanitarian aidoperations in both West Java and West Sumatra Earth-
quakes 2009 are coherence, coverage, and connectedness.
According to Beck (2006), coherence refers to the need
to assess humanitarian policies and actions taken by ac-
tors, to ensure that there is consistency and that of overlap
in actions was avoided. Thus, there will be two indicators
in measuring coherence, i.e., (1) existence and timeliness
of joint-assessment and/or joint-humanitarian action plan
and (2) qualitative performance coordination mechanism
and information sharing, while the criterion of coverage
concerns on the need to reach major population groups
facing life-threatening suffering wherever they are. Thus,
indicators of coverage are the total and percentage of
beneficiaries, geographical, and timeliness distribution of
humanitarian aid in clusters. Connectedness refers to the
need to ensure that activities of a short-term emergency
nature are carried out in a context that takes longer term
and interconnected problems into account. Thus, exist-
ence and timeliness of the Damage and Loss Assessment
(DALA), Human Recovery Need Assessment (HRNA),
and Post-Disaster Need Assessment (PDNA) documents,
as well as the continuation of organizational presence
from emergency response to the recovery phase, will be
used as indicators.
A desk study has been completed, which gathered infor-
mation regarding emergency response activities in both
earthquakes from Situation Reports published by BNPB
(National Disaster Management Agency), Indonesian Min-
istry of Health, and United Nations Office for Coordin-
ation of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), as well as the
3W Matrix (who is doing what and where) compiled by
the humanitarian partners. In creating the dataset for SNA
on both cases, information gathered from the desk study is
reorganized into a “database of emergency response activ-
ities.” In the database, each activity contains the following
fields: organization name and type, location of activity,
type of activity, sector in which the project is classified
(e.g., shelter), organization(s) responsible for the activity,
description, progress of activity, classification of financier/
executor, and beneficiaries. Given the information com-
piled in the database, a relational matrix (proxy of cooper-
ation) of emergency response is developed. Activities
included in the dataset are those implemented during the
emergency response period, by two or more organizations.
An activity that is said to be implemented by a single
organization and/or did not clearly state its implementing
partner will not be included in the dataset of input to the
SNA. The sample of emergency response activities is clas-
sified into 12 groups, in relation to humanitarian cluster
arrangement, as follows: food distribution (FD); non-food
item distribution (NFI); health services (HS); disaster
impact rapid assessment (RA); search and rescue (SAR);
coordination and communication (CC); cash support and
donation (CD); education in emergency time (Edu); water,
Bisri Journal of International Humanitarian Action  (2016) 1:8 Page 6 of 14sanitation, and hygiene (WASH) promotion; shelter
(Shelter); logistics (LOG); and others.
In the West Java case, the official emergency period was
dated from 2 to 16 September 2009. However, in reality,
the response was performed for the whole of September;
thus, all emergency response activities until 30 September
2009 were included in the dataset, i.e., accounted for taken
into consideration. On the other hand, the official emer-
gency response for the West Sumatra Earthquake 2009
was defined for 1 month. Therefore, activities dated from
30 September until 30 October 2009 were included in the
dataset, i.e., accounted for 431 sample of emergency re-
sponse activities.
The second method of data collection is through semi-
structured interviews to key actors identified from the data-
set and first iteration of the SNA modeling, i.e., can be said
as key organizations. For each organization, author inter-
viewed resource persons who came from ministries of the
central government (e.g., National Disaster Management
Agency-BNPB), agencies of West Java and West Sumatra
Provincial Governments (e.g., Local Disaster Management
Office-BPBD), agencies at local governments in affected
areas, agencies of the United Nations (e.g., UNOCHA)
international and local NGOs, and university/research insti-
tutions. Resource persons interviewed are those who are
directly involved as responder in the emergency response
of the earthquake or knowledgeable of the case. During the
interviews, confirmation to the initial findings of prelimin-
ary SNA results was addressed to resource persons. In
addition, they were asked about the questions related to the
humanitarian operation performance (coherence, coverage,
and connectedness) of the earthquakes.
The West Java and West Sumatra Earthquakes
2009, aftermath, and response
The West Java Earthquake 2009 occurred on Wednesday,
September 2, at 14:55 local time with a magnitude 7.3 on
the Richter scale and epicenter located 142 km southwest
of Tasikmalaya City, at a depth of 30 km below sea level.
This earthquake occurred due to the subduction of plates
between the Indo-Australian plate and the Eurasian plate,
in the southern part of Java Island. Fifteen municipalities
were affected, with 81 people dead, 1287 people seriously
injured, and 50,964 households or 194,805 people dis-
placed (Bappenas 2009).
The first official statement was delivered by the West Java
Governor at 22:30 on the same day in the form of West
Java Governor Decree SK 360/kep.1260-Hukham/2009
regarding Emergency Response Status. It was immediately
followed by the formation of Satkorlak West Java (Coordin-
ating Task Force for Disaster Response), and the first emer-
gency response team was dispatched by the provincial
government.1 The response phase was set for a 2-week
period, and the priorities were as follows: (1) organizingdisaster relief, (2) conducting a study and rapid assessment
for disaster impact and victim search and rescue, (3) con-
ducting rescue and evacuation, (4) fulfillment of basic
needs, (5) protection of vulnerable groups, and (6) restor-
ation of immediate infrastructure and facilities.2 Similarly,
activation of emergency response activities by agencies at
the municipality government level also took place. The
central government, BNPB in particular, supported the
decision taken by its provincial counterpart, and it sent an
assessment and quick response team to West Java and con-
nected them with the other line ministries and agencies,
such as the Ministry of Health, army, and police. On 3
September 2009, President Yudhoyono, Minister of Health,
Minister of Social Affairs, and Head of BNPB, visited the
affected areas.3
Meanwhile, UN agencies held a coordination meeting
and sent their own joint-assessment team by 3 September
2009, 05:00 in the morning.4 The purpose was to deter-
mine whether they would intervene, i.e., since at that time,
there was no formal contact made with the government.5
In parallel, some local and international NGOs, independ-
ently or jointly, started to enter the field and perform
immediate rescue activities and disaster-impact assess-
ments. Coordination between government-led humanitar-
ian efforts and those of UN agencies were made later on 5
September 2009, where BNPB and UNOCHA facilitated
meetings to update the joint assessments.6
Within the first 72 h, the government claimed that the
local and national governments had enough resources to
respond to the crisis. President Yudhoyono even stated
that international assistance was not required and the
government remained capable of handling the emergency
response given the approximately US$530,000 financial
support from the central government.7 In the subsequent
process, the government insisted, under assumption of
West Java’s capacity and its proximity to Jakarta, that the
emergency response could be handled by joint efforts from
central, provincial, and local governments, in addition to
national and local NGOs on the field. The Indonesian
government was keen to demonstrate that 5 years after the
Aceh Tsunami, they could respond to a disaster efficiently
and effectively (DARA 2010). The earthquake was per-
ceived as a time to show the international community that
Indonesia could single-handedly manage the emergency
response of a medium-large disaster.8
However, the shortage of manpower and organizational
capacity in some sectors resulted in slow progress in the
emergency response. In terms of organizational capacity,
the absence of BPBD (Provincial Disaster Management
Agency) in West Java could be the factor, which was actu-
ally mandated by Law 24/2007 on Disaster Management.
Another factor that could be overlooked by the govern-
ment was that the emergency response periods coincided
with the holiday season of Eid al-Fitr, leaving the capacity
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and social sectors, the shortage of manpower was com-
pensated through the network of national and local health
agencies with numerous universities which have medical
faculty. Many of the doctors and nurses volunteered dur-
ing the emergency response. In addition, the Ministry of
Health and Ministry of Social Affairs also has their own
national volunteer networks, which were mobilized from
neighboring regions. In other sectors, gaps were identified
for rapid assessment, water sanitation, and temporary
shelter provision, given the lack of skills and manpower
from local governments and local NGOs. Therefore, after
1 week, BNPB made a statement that in-country assist-
ance, whether from national or international organiza-
tions, was welcomed and would be coordinated under the
leadership of BNPB and Satkorlak West Java.10
Given the change in the BNPB statement, two UNOCHA
staff members were deployed to Satkorlak West Java to help
the coordination with humanitarian organizations in the
affected areas. Thus, it was agreed that four clusters would
be activated through coordination with UNOCHA and
Satkorlak West Java, i.e., education and water-sanitation
clusters were led by UNICEF, the shelter cluster was led by
the International Federation of Red Cross (IFRC), and early
recovery (including disaster impact assessment) was led by
the United Nations Development Program (UNDP). In
addition, UNOCHA routinely convened UN-NGO-Donor
Coordination meetings for emergency response of the earth-
quake. The other humanitarian sectors and health services
as well as search and rescue remained under the complete
leadership of the government with support from local/na-
tional NGOs. To complement these changes, the provincial
government issued two additional new decrees, i.e., the
formation of the Emergency Response Team for West Java
Earthquake (No. 360.05/Kep. 1263-Hukham/2009) and the
Allocation of Emergency Response Funds (No.900/Kep
1265-Keu/2009).
In total, during the emergency response periods of the
West Java Earthquake 2009, there were 343 activities
identified. Distribution of activities can be seen below.
The delivery of NFI (e.g., blanket, tent, mats) dominated
the emergency response (64 activities), followed by
health services and cash donation (each 51 activities),
see Fig. 2.
The West Sumatra Earthquake 2009 occurred on 30
September 2009, 17:16 local time, and measured 7.6 on
the Richter scale with the epicenter located 45 km
southwest of Padang City. As an aftermath, the earth-
quake caused 1117 deaths and 2902 injuries (BNPB
2009). In addition, there were 250,000 families (around
1,250,000 people or 25 % from total West Sumatra
population) being internally displaced and affected by
the earthquake. In total, there were 249,653 houses
damaged, i.e., 114,797 homes severely damaged, 67,198moderately damaged, and another 67,658 lightly dam-
aged (BNPB 2009).
Since the West Sumatra Earthquake 2009 occurred less
than a month after the one in West Java, it placed a
second wave of demands on the Indonesian disaster man-
agement authorities. Given this situation, after a high-level
ministerial meeting, BNPB announced that emergency
response to the earthquake and relief provisions would
take place for 2 months,11 i.e., although it was later re-
duced to 1 month given the performance of emergency
response activities from both local and international orga-
nizations.12 Along with the decision from BNPB, President
Yudhoyono announced that the Government of Indonesia
welcomed international assistance but needed to be coor-
dinated through the government.13
In the first 24 h, different from the approach in West
Java, the Governor of West Sumatra, Satkorlak West Suma-
tra, and under approval from BNPB, invited the UNOCHA
to become their counterpart in managing coordination and
cooperation for humanitarian aid delivery in both emer-
gency response and early recovery14; even the governor
provided an office for UNOCHA in his residence (DARA
2010). As an immediate response, a joint mission from the
UN, led by UNOCHA and comprised of officers from
FAO, UNDP, UNFPA, UNICEF, and WHO, was deployed
to Padang City within the first 18 h. Later on, the UN
mission was empowered by the arrival of the UNDAC team
(UN Disaster Assessment and Coordination). Also, in the
evening of the quake day, BNPB coordinated deployment
of its own personnel and other national ministries; they
reached West Sumatra in the dawn of 1 October 2009 and
were perceived timely by the provincial government and its
city counterpart.15 On the other hand, some international
NGOs independently also started to send their teams to
West Sumatra, in particular those affiliated with the ECB
Consortium, which in this earthquake was led by Mercy
Corps. It seems that local authorities did not want to repeat
the same mistakes made in West Java.
Although it was not fully operational within the first week,
less than 48 h after the earthquake, it was agreed that the
humanitarian cluster approach would be activated.16 There
were ten humanitarian clusters: (1) agriculture with FAO
and UNDP as lead agencies; (2) coordination and safety and
early recovery with UNDP and Bappeda West Sumatra as
lead agencies; (3) education with UNICEF, Save the Children
(STC), and Education Agency of West Sumatra as lead
agencies; (4) food and nutrition with WFP and UNICEF as
lead agencies; (5) health with WHO and Health Agency of
West Sumatra as lead agencies; (6) logistic and telecommu-
nications with WFP as lead agency; (7) protection with
UNICEF, UNFPA, and Social Agency of West Sumatra as
lead agencies; (8) shelter with IFRC as lead agency; (9) water,
sanitation, and hygiene (WASH) with UNICEF as lead
agency; and (10) emergency telecommunications with WFP
Fig. 2 Number of emergency response activities in both earthquakes (Source: author’s calculation from various situation reports)
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both local and international actors.
During emergency response periods in West Sumatra,
431 sample activities were identified, which took place from
30 September to 30 October 2009. As can be seen from
Fig. 2, activities related to NFI distribution to disaster vic-
tims and refugees ranked the highest (70 activities), followed
by health service and WASH (each 60 activities). Variations
of activities not categorized in the preceding 11 groups
include debris removal activity, a cash-for-work program,
distribution of disaster-risk-reduction booklets, and eco-
nomic recovery programs for small-medium enterprises.
Network of inter-organizational cooperation in
West Java and West Sumatra
As can be seen in Fig. 3, in the 2009 West Java Earthquake,
there were 192 organizations involved in emergency re-
sponse, and most organizations were national/local NGO
(50) and local government agencies (45). There were also
22 international NGOs identified, of which some of them
were already in West Java due to their operations in the
recovery of the 2006 Pangandaran Tsunami. Also, there
were 21 universities involved, most of which were repre-
sented by their medical faculty in the health cluster. There
were 18 agencies from provincial governments and 10
agencies/ministries from central governments. In addition,
16 private companies contributed by giving cash or in-kind
assistance. In terms of UN agency deployment, there were
eight, and only two foreign government agencies involved.
On the other hand, in West Sumatra, there were 223
organizations involved. Record showed involvement of 63
international NGOs (28 %) and 40 local government agen-
cies (18 %). The number of foreign governments which
provided assistance was also quite high, accounting for 35agencies (16 %). In terms of national/local NGOs, there
were 29 organizations (13 %). On the other hand, 17 agen-
cies and ministries of the central government also inter-
vened directly (8 %), and so did 18 agencies of the
provincial government (8 %). Lastly, there were 12 agencies
of the UN (5 %), three universities (only 1 %), and six
private companies (only 3 %) involved.
Based on the data of actors and emergency response
activities, network analysis was performed. The network
in West Java comprises 192 nodes (identified actors) and
729 ties which resulted from 343 identified activities,
while the network in West Sumatra comprises 223
nodes and 865 ties resulted from 431 identified activities.
Furthermore, calculation on degree and betweenness
centrality of all actors in both networks was performed,
and the result of the top-15 actors with the highest cen-
trality can be found in Fig. 4.
In comparing networks created in both earthquakes to
fit in Gillmann’s typology, the principal-component-mode
visualization was performed, based on the value of degree
and betweenness centrality above. This step visualizes the
result of degree and betweenness centrality measurements
in a graph and clarifies better which organizations served
as leader(s) or as follower(s) in the network. As can be
seen in Fig. 5, the network in West Java fits the lead-
agency type of network in Gillmann’s typology, with one
provincial government body ranked significantly as the
network’s leader having clear authority as a decision
maker and controlled access to the field, which was also
supported closely by BNPB, the central government. At
the same time, several organizations leading four clusters
in West Java had a distant position with the lead agency,
i.e., PMI (Indonesian Red Cross), IFRC, UNICEF, Ministry
of Health (Kemenkes), and Health Agency (Dinkes) of
Fig. 3 Number of agencies involved during emergency response of both earthquakes (Source: author’s calculation from various situation reports)
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can be seen in Fig. 4, the network was very centralized
and linked to Satkorlak West Java with its normalized
degree centrality 6.702. As a national agency, BNPB thus
ranked second in terms of degree centrality, which mainly
supported and supervised Satkorlak West Java, since the
province did not have their own BPBD. Dinkes West Java
also ranked third with high degree centrality since the
agency mostly bridged the Kemenkes and health agencies
at the municipality level. Afterwards, UNOCHA ranked
fifth in terms of centrality due to its network with INGOs
and local NGOs and the late introduction of cluster ar-
rangement. There are two national NGOs which scored
high in terms of degree centrality, i.e., PMI, ranked fifth,
and PKPU, ranked seventh. PMI has pre-establishedFig. 4 Result of degree centrality and betweenness centrality measuremenbranches at provincial and local levels, while PKPU was
involved in several humanitarian clusters at one time.
While viewed from the principal-component network
mode, the network of actors in West Sumatra fits the lead-
partnership type. As can be seen from Fig. 5, Satkorlak
West Sumatra, UNOCHA, UNICEF, IOM, IFRC, BNPB,
STC, WFP, and UNDP are identified as principals of the
network. Those organizations were the focal points of the
network, BPBD West Sumatra, BNPB, and UNOCHA,
with the remaining organizations all humanitarian cluster
lead agencies. It is seeming that the “cluster approach” did
function in orchestrating emergency response during the
West Sumatra Earthquake 2009. In addition to UNOCHA,
BNPB, and Satkorlak West Sumatra, among the top-15
organizations with the highest degree centrality, almost allts (Source: author’s analysis)
Fig. 5 Comparison of principal-component networks in West Java and West Sumatra (Source: author’s analysis)
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tweenness measurement reveals, organizations which play
an important role in bridging other humanitarian actors
ranked within the top ten. Most notably is IOM, which
provided ground-transportation support for all organiza-
tions to deliver food, non-food items, and any other
disaster relief aid to the affected areas. In the process,
IOM later joined WFP to share the leading role in the lo-
gistic cluster. It was then followed by UNICEF, which
bridged many members in education, food and nutrition,
protection, and WASH clusters. Specifically, in the health
cluster, the WHO also played an instrumental role in
bridging international NGOs and local organizations
through the Ministry of Health and Health Agency ofWest Sumatra and thus ranked third in terms of between-
ness centrality. As for IFRC, it had an instrumental role in
bridging PMI with other Red Cross teams.
As a whole, the network density in West Java is 5.005
with 37 inter-organizational cliques detected, while in
West Sumatra, the network density is 5.259 with 40
inter-organizational cliques detected. Clique analysis was
completed with a minimum set size of four organiza-
tions, performed in directed measurement. Although the
number of cliques is somewhat similar, the membership
characteristic shows some differences. In the West Java
case, out of 37 cliques identified, 10 of them purely con-
sist of national-local organizations. Furthermore, 8 out
of those 10 cliques are related to emergency response in
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Java and West Sumatra Earthquakes 2009, aftermath, and
response” section initially did not invite activation of the
health cluster under international humanitarian partner.
The remaining 27 cliques are characterized as having a
combination of at least national government agencies
(e.g., BNPB, Basarnas, Indonesian Army, or Ministry of
Health), at least one agency of the UN or international
NGO, and at least one agency of the West Java provincial
government or national NGO. On the other hand, in the
case of West Sumatra, only two cliques that purely consist
of national-local agencies, i.e., a clique of BNPB, West
Sumatra Province, Indonesian Police, and Indonesian
Army, as well as a clique of the Ministry of Education,
West Sumatra Education Agency, Bandung Institute of
Technology, and Andalas University. The rest of the 38
cliques are a combination of international and national/
local organizations, with at least one out of the two cluster
lead identified in the clique.
It should be noted that although both provinces have a
similar level of organizational capacity, a different approach
was taken in terms of how to orchestrate coordination and
cooperation of emergency response and the statement of
welcoming international assistance. By saying organizational
capacity, it mainly refers to the fact that by September 2009,
both provincial governments had not formed their BPBD
and at the municipality level, their BPBDs were neither non-
existence nor still infant. In West Java, BNPB supported
centralization of coordination to Satkorlak West Java and
initially neither requested for international assistance nor
encouraged activation of the humanitarian cluster system,
while in West Sumatra, from the very beginning, the provin-
cial government and BNPB welcomed international assist-
ance and instantly agreed on activating the humanitarian
cluster system. Consequently, Satkorlak West Sumatra,
under supervision from BNPB, partnered with UNOCHA
and other humanitarian clusters lead agencies.
Humanitarian aid operation performance in West
Java and West Sumatra
Humanitarian operations in West Sumatra performed bet-
ter in all criteria of coherence, coverage, and connected-
ness compared to West Java. As noted by Pranoto (2011),
the UNDAC team praised Indonesia’s capability in man-
aging evacuation stages during emergency response in
West Sumatra. While commenting on response in West
Java, UNOCHA (2009) and DARA (2010) called the West
Java Earthquake 2009 as a “forgotten disaster.” In terms of
coherence, West Sumatra’s network was more cohesive, as
indicated from the calculated network density (5.259) and
number of cliques found (37). All nine humanitarian clusters
were activated faster, within 48 h, and legitimate, whereas
humanitarian clusters were clearly being led by government
agencies and UN agencies/INGOs, as in contrast with thefour clusters activation 1 week after the earthquake with un-
clear appointments of government agencies to become
counterpart of the cluster’s lead agency in West Java. There
were also more joint assessments identified, as opposed to
the many uncoordinated assessments with delay in the offi-
cial assessment found in West Java. Humanitarian aid oper-
ation in West Sumatra is also more coherent with the
existence of the West Sumatra Earthquake 2009 Humanitar-
ian Response Plan, whereas no similar document existed in
West Java. These situations are indeed affected greatly by
the initial statement of the government in responding to
both earthquakes. In West Java, as mentioned by Wilson
(2010), many NGOs felt confused and hesitant to intervene.
While in West Sumatra, many actors appreciated the coord-
ination of the humanitarian operations.
Humanitarian operations in West Sumatra also per-
formed better from coverage criterion. During the first
72 h until the end of the first week, SAR activities in
West Java ended with inadequate manpower to continue
the remaining relief activities, while such a situation was
not found in West Sumatra since, at the same period,
international SAR teams already arrived and provided
additional manpower. In West Sumatra, the emergency
response was finished earlier than scheduled, shortened
from 2 to 1 month, given the fast distribution of aid,
while in West Java, it was extended from 2 weeks to
1 month. The time when external emergency relief
started and the time needed until it reached beneficiaries
were also faster than those in West Java (BNPB 2009),
i.e., 4 to 7 days in West Sumatra and 7 to 9 days in West
Java. Based on DARA’s calculation (2010), 90 % of needs
in West Sumatra were actually being met even with only
37 % fulfillment of the budget in the West Sumatra
Humanitarian Response Plan, as opposed to only 60 %
in West Java. Based on the author’s calculation, on aver-
age, 85 % from total IDPs in West Sumatra covered or
gained benefit from emergency provisions, while in West
Java, only around 60 %. However, in terms of percent
beneficiaries receiving health services and food aid in
both West Java and West Sumatra, on average, 80 % of
the total affected people in each municipality did receive
benefit.
Lastly, in terms of connectedness, humanitarian opera-
tions in West Sumatra also performed better. First, all
DALA, HRNA, and PDNA documents which needed to
ensure orchestrated emergency response and transition to
recovery were published faster in West Sumatra than in
West Java, i.e., the process was activated timely 2 weeks
the after disaster and the documents were published less
than 5 weeks after the earthquake, while in West Java, it
was published after 7 weeks from the earthquake. In this
sense, even when measured against current BNPB regula-
tions (BNPB 2011), which at that time were not in oper-
ation, efforts in West Sumatra were already in compliance
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Sumatra also provided a strong base for recovery, mainly
with its timely and high coverage of temporary shelter,
while in West Java, even as of February 2010, people still
reported living in tents. Further connectedness with the
recovery plan saw preparation processes in West Sumatra
being conducted jointly with other local stakeholders and
international partners, while in West Java, only by the
government. As a consequence, West Sumatra has greater
organizational retention towards the recovery period, e.g.,
five out of seven ECB agencies remained on the field,
more than 50 INGOs continued the recovery process, the
humanitarian clusters transformed into working groups
and legitimized by the government, and the early recovery
efforts led legitimately and operationally by UNDP and
Development Planning Agency of West Sumatra (Bappeda).
While in West Java, only two out of seven ECB agencies
remained, there was no clear role of clusters in recovery,
and although early recovery was said to be led by UNDP,
there was no clear coordination with the West Java
government.
Conclusions and recommendations
This research, through SNA measurements and qualitative
analysis, complements specific findings regarding the
emergency response of the West Java Earthquake 2009
and the West Sumatra Earthquake 2009 made by Wilson
(2010) and DARA (2010). Although both provinces have
similar levels of organizational capacity, different ap-
proaches were taken in terms of how to orchestrate coord-
ination and cooperation of emergency response and on
statement of welcoming international assistance. By saying
organizational capacity, it mainly refers to the fact that by
September 2009, both provincial governments have not
formed their BPBD and at the municipality level, their
BPBDs were neither non-existence nor still infant. In West
Java, BNPB supported centralization of coordination to
Satkorlak West Java and initially neither requested for
international assistance nor encouraged activation of the
humanitarian cluster system, while in West Sumatra, from
the very beginning, the provincial government and BNPB
welcomed international assistance and instantly agreed on
activating the humanitarian cluster system. Consequently,
Satkorlak West Sumatra, under supervision from BNPB,
worked in tandem with UNOCHA and other humanitarian
cluster lead agencies. The network of inter-organizational
cooperation formed on the ground is indeed not isolated
from one another, i.e., the response in West Sumatra was
also modified given the performance of emergency response
in West Java. However, this research specifically compared
networks in both cases, as a result of a conscious political
decision by the government, as to test Gillmann’s typ-
ology. By performing a lead-partnership mode of net-
work which was comprised of all nine humanitarianclusters and activated timely, it was proven that humani-
tarian operations in West Sumatra performed better in all
criteria of coherence, coverage, and connectedness.
This research, however, found a different conclusion than
Gillmann’s typology that the lead-agency type of network
will always perform better if planned to be in operation;
while at the same time supported Gillmann’s pre-statement
to her own typology that without adequate capacity and
legitimacy of a lead agency, it is better to return and per-
form inter-organizational cooperation in emergency re-
sponse activities by using the lead-partnership mode of
network. Lastly, although still needing to be tested with
other case studies, one of the possible implications from
this research is that in a country or disaster-affected areas
where the remaining governmental capacity exists but is
still in infancy or developing their institutional capacity,
lead partnership in humanitarian operations is better; while
a lead-agency type of network led by UN agencies or NGOs
is more appropriate for disaster situations and humanitar-
ian operations where the remaining governmental capacity
is weaker.
Given the findings of this research, the network of actors
in a humanitarian operation should not only be fully associ-
ated with a lead-agency type of network but also can be
strengthened in the operation through a lead-partnership
type of network. Therefore, for some regulations in
Indonesia, it is vital to add another criterion which regulates
regarding at what level of disasters in association with the
remaining local (or national) government capacity; thus, the
command system for humanitarian operations will be imple-
mented through a lead agency or a lead partnership, i.e., in
relation to Indonesian Government Regulation 23/2008
regarding The Role of International Agencies and Inter-
national Non-Government Organizations in Disaster Man-
agement, BNPB’s Regulation Number 14/2010 regarding
Guideline in Creating Command Post for Disaster Emer-
gency Response, and BNPB’s Regulation 22/2010 regarding
the Role of the International Organization and Non-
governmental International Organizations during Emer-
gency Response.
The same applies to the risk of regional-level disasters,
for example, in the Southeast Asian region. Alternatives on
whether to perform a lead-agency or a lead-partnership
type of network in an emergency situation can enrich the
detailed implementation of the ASEAN Coordinating
Center for Humanitarian Assistance on disaster manage-
ment (AHA Centre), on facilitating regional standby ar-
rangements for disaster relief and emergency response. The
AHA Centre is recommended to identify the level of disas-
ters and the remaining capacity of the government in order
to determine whether it should intervene as lead agency or
maintain lead partnership among national governments in
managing emergency response to regional-level disasters.
Lastly, as can be learned from this research, basically, the
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capacities and levels of engagement between international/
domestic and government/non-government actors. In the
future, the various cluster arrangements should take into
consideration when deciding whether the inter-cluster
coordination should use lead-agency or lead-partnership
type of network. Where in-country IASC exist, like in
Indonesia, this consideration can be introduced to the
inter-agency contingency plan managed by IASC.
For further scholarly purposes, the author would like to
also recommend further research suggestions; first, there is
merit to conduct research which detects networks of actors
involved in not only humanitarian operations during emer-
gency response but also those of which participated in dis-
aster risk reduction and the development field in general,
both before and after a disaster or the long-term recovery
phase. Second, it is also recommended to conduct similar
research for other types of disasters, especially with a slow-
onset disaster characteristic, e.g., volcanic eruptions and
climate-related disasters, and politically sensitive humani-
tarian crises, such as domestic conflict or civil war. By
doing so, a broader view can be seen whether the current
system and organizations which are actively involved in
disaster management are able to perform regardless of the
disaster type. Third, the author would like to suggest the
utilization of SNA for enriching the ongoing innovation of
real-time evaluation (RTE) in disaster situations or humani-
tarian crises. At the same time, a better record of emer-
gency response activities in all humanitarian clusters in an
RTE will improve network modeling and will measure
humanitarian aid delivery performance more accurately.
Lastly, it is also worth to perform an ethnographic ap-
proach and network census in creating input for a dataset,
i.e., not solely depending on recorded data in Situation
Reports. With this, it will also be possible to distinguish
between formal networks among organizations and infor-
mal network among agencies of organizations.
Endnotes
1Daily Report Pusdalops (Crisis Operation Center)
BNPB—3 September 2009
2Summarized from Governor Decree SK 360/kep.1260-
Hukham/2009 on Emergency Response Status
3Daily Report Pusdalops (Crisis Operation Center)
BNPB—4 September 2009
4West Java Earthquake 2009 Situation Report #2, 3
September 2009, UNOCHA
5Interview with Key Person P, March 2012
6West Java Earthquake 2009 Situation Report #3, 4
September 2009, UNOCHA
7Ibid
8Interview with Key Person X, March 2012
9Confirmed in interviews with Key Person D and Key
Person L, both in March 201210BNPB West Java Earthquake Situation Report 7
September 2009
11West Sumatra Earthquake 2009 Situation Report #1
(UNOCHA 2009)
12West Sumatra Earthquake 2009 Situation Report #8
(UNOCHA 2009)
13West Sumatra Earthquake 2009 Situation Report #2
(UNOCHA 2009)
14In the interview with Key Person A in February
2013, after the earthquake, by 18:00, the provincial
government started their first rapid assessment; thus, by
23:00, they sent a request to BNPB based on the assess-
ment result, and later, by 03:00, the provincial govern-
ment has set up a command center in the Governor’s
office and was ready to host incoming officials from the
Central Government and UN Agencies.
15Confirmed in interviews with key person A, E, T,
and U in February 2013
16Summarized from documentation by Pranoto (2011)
and West Sumatra Earthquake 2009 Situation Report #3,
UNOCHA
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